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BOOK REVIEWS
TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. D. C. M. Yardley.
London: Butterworth and Company, 1960. Pp. ix, 151.

INTRODUCTION

As the title suggests, this small volume, written by a Barrister-at-Law,
presents a brief introduction to the constitutional law of the British Isles;
however, significant discussions of some of the main areas of comparison
with the constitutional law of the Commonwealth and the United States
are also presented owing to the fact that the comparative method is frequently employed in order to show important similarities and differences
between the English system, other common law nations, and Scotland.
The general aim of this book is not to present an additional learned
treatise on the subject of English constitutional law. Rather, the express
purpose of the work is to provide, ".

.

. a brief composite sketch of the

field that any student of the subject must traverse, and to suggest the
problems which exist rather than to attempt to solve them."1 In brief,
an elementary law school text has been written. As the author states:
"This volume is therefore directed primarily towards the needs of university law students just beginning their study of constitutional law ..."2
Part I, which comprises three-quarters of the text, is devoted to a
discussion of the "Principles of British Constitutional Law," and in this
section, the main problem, or the reason that the book was written, is
presented-namely, what precisely constitutes the unwritten constitution?
In other words, from what portions of the mass of source material that
forms the entire body of English, Scottish, and Northern Irish law, might
a student, or for that matter a Barrister, be able to glean the provisions
of their constitution?
Specifically, the constitution is derived partly from custom, ancient
documents, and written sources such as common law cases; but primarily

from the acts of Parliament, which are the "supreme law of the land"
in a legal system lacking a concept of judicial review as it exists here in
America.

The author, consequently, takes the position that ".

.

. the Con-

stitution of any country must comprise the fundamental structure and
organization of that country
1 p.

. . ."8

He goes on to state:

"...

therefore

vii.

2 p. viii.
3 P. 2. Yardley adopts the following definition of the constitution of a state as
.. the system of laws, customs and conventions which define the composition
and powers of organs of the State and regulate the relations of the various State
organs to one another and to the private citizen." 0. Hood Phillips, Constitutional
Law of Great Britain and the Commonwealth (2nd Ed., 1957), p. 5.
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constitutional law is its fundamental law, its basic, essential law, whether
it be civil, criminal, public or private, together with those rules of conduct
laid down to govern the exercise of state power by the official organs of
the state.' 4
Thus, the main problem confronting any Barrister is to determine
which of the numerous laws of the state actually comprise the constitution.
Of course, the supremacy of the British Parliament permits a much easier
change of this basic law than would be the case in a country that had
established a complicated system of amendment providing for the altera5
tion of a written constitution.
The greatest single difference between the judicial systems of Great
Britain and America is the lack of any concept of judicial review for the
reason that, ". . . Parliament in its legislative capacity may introduce,
alter or repeal any law it thinks fit, and in each case the effect will have
been to formulate a new law for the future. Such law is absolutely binding
upon all courts, and the only discretion permitted to the courts is that of
6
deciding how the law is to be applied to particular facts."
The author points out, and correctly so, that the courts have the
absolute duty of applying the letter and spirit of the statute in question
and to enforce the law once its meaning has been determined. In addition, in the United Kingdom, acts of Parliament are completely binding
upon the courts.7 In particular, ". . . it is never possible for the courts
to question the validity of existing Acts of Parliament." 8
The rhetorical question is then answered by the following:
United Kingdom constitutional law comprises all those laws, derived from
the various sources referred to above, which are fundamental to the
organisation of the state, together with such lesser rules as are laid down to
facilitate the working of this organisation, but it also includes a certain
element of pure convention."9
4

P. 2.

5The author also incorporates in Chapter V, "The Rule of Law," the main
propositions of Dicey that are considered to be basic, especially the maxim that
all men are equal before the law. A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution (9th Ed., 1938), pp. 188-196. Yardley says at page 57:
"The great value of Dicey's work in this field has been to provide lawyers and
jurists with an ideal. . . . [I]t cannot be considered as a basic tenet of our constitutional law. But as a guide to law-makers and reformers it can be of inestimable value. . . . In short, the rule of law is not a rule or a law, but a
persuasive guide for the legislature, the executive and the judiciary."
6 P. 44.
7 Pp. 43-46.

8 P. 45.
9 P. 4.
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Since the precise subjects that may be included in the scope of the
fundamental law may be defined differently, or even be open to dispute,
the author provides a short list, which he feels will adequately cover the
subject matter areas to be included in the text, as follows: "(1) the law
concerning the composition of the national legislature and legislative
powers; (2) the law concerning the composition and functions of national
government; (3) the hierarchy and status of courts of law; (4) the limits
of personal liberty and the rights of the individual; (5) the relationship
between the executive and the individual; (6) the law of nationality and
the status of aliens; (7) the status of certain national institutions, such
as the armed forces and the Church; (8) the relations between central
and local government; and (9) the relationship between the United Kingdom and its dependencies, and with the independent members of the
Commonwealth. "10
Moreover, separate chapters are devoted to an explanation and analysis
of the branches of the Government, particularly the Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Much of the data presented deals with the
basic structure and function of these units in the British system; nevertheless, in Chapter VI, the problem of "Separation of Powers" is briefly
discussed, and it is significant to note that the British concept of separation of powers differs from that in the United States. To illustrate, the
United States system is described as a system of checks and balances; but,
on the other hand, the basic structure of the English system under which
the government ministers sit in the two houses of Parliament, plus the
lack of a separate executive head not directly responsible to a legislative
body, and the lack of any judicial review, render a similar strict separation
of powers impossible."
In particular, this chapter on "The Doctrine of the Separation of
Powers" serves to bring into sharper focus the more precise and detailed
data dealt with in the earlier chapters wherein the branches of government were discussed individually.
The remaining chapters in Part I are devoted to the position of the
Church 1 2 and the unique constitutional features of the legal systems of
Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. 13
Perhaps, the most significant chapter is entitled "Rights and Duties
of the Citizen," for it is here that the author offers the observation that
loP. 6.
11 See pages 58-62.
12

Chapt. IX.

13 Chapt. VII.
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... as far as British constitutional law is concerned, our main task is to
determine in what ways individual liberty is restricted by law, and not
how it is preserved."' 4 Therefore, his view is that the English constitution does not confer or even protect any of the common law rights of
Englishmen; furthermore, an interesting comparison is made with the
United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. In short, the view presented is that basically the individual citizen may take any action he
desires, since he has all basic rights and freedoms in so far as his actions
and acquisition of property are concerned; but the state-meaning the
branches of Government acting in their respective spheres-restrict the
actions of the private person by placing limitations upon him in order to
provide for the common good. The result of this negative approach is that
certain basic rights are curtailed by operation of law; consequently, the
remainder of the chapter presents an elaboration of the particular restrictions placed upon individual actions by English law. 15
Part II of the book contains a brief analysis of the system of administrative law in Great Britain, while Part III, comprising only one short
chapter, reviews the concept of the Commonwealth and the legal status of
the various independent members in the scheme of the unwritten British
constitutional law.
This small text should serve as a valuable source book for the comparative study of constitutional law in differing legal systems; and, furthermore, enable legally minded individuals to obtain a clearer understanding of the development of the fundamental common law even though
the book was not originally intended for use in America.
W. PAUL GORMLEY

Recorded in Talks with Dr. Harlan B.
New York: Reynal & Company, 1960. Pp. ix, 310.

FELIx FRANKFURTER REMINISCES.

Phillips.

Here is a delightful collection of reminiscent conversation by the
present Justice relating in random fashion events of his life from student
days to the time of his appointment by President Roosevelt to the Supreme Court of the land.
14 P.72.
15 The basic fundamental rights that the author feels are curtailed include the
following: "(1) freedom of the person to behave as he pleases, (2) equality before
the law, (3) freedom of property, (4) the right to free elections, (5) freedom of
speech and to write, (6) freedom of public worship, (7) freedom of assembly and
association, and (8) family rights." See page 72. Each of these common law
rights receive individual coverage in the book.
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In casual and subjective manner, Justice Frankfurter recites the elements of chance which brought him to Harvard Law School. He follows
with his initial assignment to the United States Attorney's office, and the
call to teaching with rich and rewarding years as a professor at Harvard
Law School. Throughout, he tells of various government services, which
from time to time interrupted his academic work. As a series of disconnected expressions, the book nevertheless maintains a strong continuity
of subject matter, and the whole combines as an enthusiastic account of
rich and well-spent years.
As often in the case of accounts such as here, this series of reminiscences combines excellently the full expression of Justice Frankfurter's
inspiring philosophy together with a stimulating account of surges and
patterns of thinking in the changing United States.
Of course, the primary emphasis is upon his own views and thinking,
but it is the very intensity of his examination which brings into sharpest
focus the changing years of government and social growth which he witnessed. Nor is he charitable of men in high position who for one reason
or another he found inadequate.
First, Frankfurter himself lived a full and rewarding existence during the period when government began the swing, with the Theodore
Roosevelt administration, from its position as servant of large industry
and smug isolationism to "trust busting" under "Teddy" and the growth
of social legislation, and the new concept of America as a responsible world
power, which started under Wilson and came to fullest realization under
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Secondly, he participated actively in almost
every phase of the newer concepts of government responsibility both on
the scene, and in world affairs.
Through all this, and from his vantage point as a professor at Harvard
University Law School, Frankfurter participated actively in this social
growth. In his reminiscences Justice Frankfurter speaks with genuine
enjoyment of the share that fell to him in drafting of legislation, in prosecuting matters as First Assistant United States Attorney, and the several
opportunities for public service which came his way under such diverse
presidents as Taft, Wilson, Hoover, and, of course, Roosevelt.
As a nostalgic discourse on Justice Frankfurter and the many greats,
both high and law, this small volume has a charm all out of proportion
to its pages.

At all times its author held to his own ideas; at all times he made
sharp incisive evaluation of people and events around him. These he
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shares generously in this work. Indeed, the spice and richness of the book
lies in great part in his unhesitating freedom with which he expresses
strong opinion, favorable and otherwise, of the people whom he met and
with whom he worked.
Of President and later Chief Justice Taft, he quotes Brandeis approvingly, "It's very difficult for me to understand why a man who is so good
as Chief Justice .

.

. could have been so bad as a President."'

Of Henry Morgenthau, he held great contempt; for Herbert Hoover
the feeling that the man was guided by violent prejudice with little
contact in reality.
The very light heartedness of Frankfurter 's approach brings a greater
appreciation of the professor himself. It presents a most inspiring story
of the events of his life, and as by accident, a critical evaluation of the
changing times around him.
Frankfurter took a leading part in such unpopular causes as the
Tom Mooney and Sacco-Vanzetti cases, remote to us now, but which stirred
America and the world in the decades past. And even as he held to his
own ideas and convictions, his reputation continued to grow in completely
reactionary as well as liberal circles.
We see, also, in this gentle philosophical account of a rewarding
academic life, the beautiful value placed on friendship and the rewards
of friendship which came to the Justice.
The list of those in this country and in England with whom
he maintained such friendships is a list of the intellectual and political
leadership of the period. He tells a touching story of ideas shared, the
greatest value lies in his simple accounts advanced and explored through
enriching years of simple luncheon and dinner discourses. From his
recollections we share in the exchange and contribution of ideas.
Even so simple a work as this tells a moving account of the years in
which Frankfurter made his great intellectual contributions.
He came on the scene during the administration of President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1906, served through Taft, Wilson and remained in one
capacity or another to work on much of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
New Deal legislation.
He quotes his wife's apt description of President Coolidge as "arid,"
and expresses freely his wonder at the continued Republican party victories
1 P. 85.
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in 1924 and 1928, despite the scandals which rocked the Harding administration.
Of New Deal legislation, he says simply, "Of course much of the
legislation was poorly drawn. Roosevelt was compelled in a few short
months to catch up with more than a hundred years of social legislation
already enacted by all European countries. "2
He tells, too, of the changing philosophical attitudes of the legal profession from the twenties to the thirties. While during the nineteen
twenties the leading graduates turned their eyes to the well paying New
York offices, without thought to the complexities of the world in which
they lived, by 1932 the direction was to Washington and opportunity to
participate in the great social activity there going on. The great depression brought a belated recognition by the profession of its social responsibilities.
For the greater part, Justice Frankfurter remains severely critical of
his profession. He feels that lawyers generally have the obligation to lead,
rather than simply implement the predatory wishes and activities of their
clients. In this, the profession has not met its obligation.
Here is a simple but remarkable piece of writing by a remarkable
jurist of our times. Justice Frankfurter combines driving social conscience
with rare intellectual ability. The simple and unaffected study of basic
philosophical concepts is an inspiration to lawyers, and represents a concept of social responsibility and intellectual growth, in the framework of
unshaking integrity.
M. J. SATTER

2 P. 128.
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